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Benjamin Strong Jr. 
          
           Benjamin Strong Jr. gave no speeches and did not appear in public to wax 
theoretically on the ways of economics and high finance. He was J.P. Morgan’s 
workhorse, and he built his reputation and his fortune from the ground up.  
          Adeline Torrey Schenck married a railroader/small-farmer named Benjamin 
Strong, and together they had four sons and a daughter. Her forceful personality befitted 
Adeline, the daughter of a prominent Presbyterian writer, theologian, and minister, and 
her four sons continued the tradition of prominence in their respective fields. The oldest 
was a Princeton graduate who earned a Ph.D. from Columbia University and became a 
professor of neurology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Her second son 
became the vice president of the American Radiator Company and partner in the 
engineering firm of Meyer, Strong, and Jones. Her youngest boy went on to a highly 
 3
successful career in medicine and psychiatry after earning degrees from Princeton and the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons.  
          Adeline’s third son Benjamin Jr., was left no choice but to forego college because 
of a lack of financial stability in the family at the time of his high school graduation. Yet, 
he went on to become the governor of the New York branch of the Federal Reserve and 
one of the most powerful and influential men in the United States.
1
 
          In 1891, at the age of 18, Benjamin Strong left the family home in Montclair, New 
York, to seek his fortune in finance. After being quickly fired from his first job for of all 
things, poor penmanship, he entered the firm of Jessup, Patton and Company, which 
became John Patton and Company, which became Cuyler, Morgan and Company (as in 
J.P. Morgan). He started as a clerk, and by 1900 Strong was representing international 
investors in real estate and securities ventures. 
          He left Cuyler, Morgan, and Company at twenty-six, to join the Atlantic Trust 
Company, which in 1903, became the Metropolitan Trust Company. He married 
Margaret LeBoutillier, started a family, and soon settled in the prominent New York City 
suburb of Englewood, New Jersey. There, he and his wife entered the social circles of 
their community, and Benjamin met a man who would alter the course of his life forever. 
Henry P. Davidson was a neighbor of the Strong’s and in April, 1904, offered Strong a 
job at the newly founded Bankers Trust Company, owned by J.P. Morgan. 
          Bankers Trust was an instant success. Known as a “banker’s bank,” it held the 
reserves of banks and other trust companies as a correspondent for them, and often made 
loans to those banks and others, so they could repair their reserve positions or strains on 
                                                             
1Lester V. Chandler. Benjamin Strong, Central Banker (Washington D.C., 1958), 21-22. 
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their leverage. Bankers Trust wrote many of these types of loans when the panic of 1907 
hit the industry. 
          Davidson appointed Strong to a committee to determine which institutions could be 
saved after the panic, and which would be sacrificed. The committee answered to three 
men; J.P. Morgan, George F. Baker, and James Stillman. J.P. Morgan trusted only 
Benjamin Strong’s reports and adopted him as a key advisor. Morgan was merciless, 
locking prominent bankers in his library and pocketing the key until they found a way to 
aid the institutions he saw fit to rescue. Strong summarized these trying times later in life 
as, “the endless incidents, some tragic, some humorous, many of them exciting or 
depressing, which characterized those weeks of strain and anxiety.”
2
 
          Strong’s anxieties did not end at the workplace. In 1905, his wife Margaret bore 
their fourth child. She was stricken with what could have only been post-partum 
depression and other psychological ailments, and committed suicide. His friend and 
neighbor, Henry Davidson, took the Strong children into his home, and Strong plunged 
himself into work. Then, in 1907, at the age of thirty-five, he married the twenty year old 
Katherine Converse; daughter of Edmund C. Converse, the president of Bankers Trust. 
This marriage, too, ended unhappily when Katherine left Strong, took their two 
daughters, and divorced him in 1920.
3
 
          In 1909, Strong’s other good friend and neighbor from Englewood, Thomas 
Lamont, resigned as vice president of the Bankers Trust to become vice president of the 
First National Bank. Strong succeeded him as vice president of Bankers Trust, working 
directly under his new Father-in-law. When Converse retired, Strong became the 
                                                             
2 Chandler, 25-29. 
3 Chandler, 30. 
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president of Bankers Trust in January of 1914. By this time the company had merged 
with Mercantile Trust Company, and Manhattan Trust Company, making it the second 
largest trust company in the country. The position would last only ten months, as Strong 
resigned from his post as president of Bankers Trust, as well as from the myriad other 
business affiliations he had formed, like trustee of Seamen’s Bank for Savings (which his 
great-grandfather helped found), and the boards of directors of two other trust companies, 
and more than a dozen railroad, public utility, and industrial corporations. He left all this, 





Below is a copy of the original telegram received from John Skelton Williams, 
Comptroller of the Currency, to Pierre Jay, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
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         Benjamin Strong kept a hand-written note, which he wrote to himself, in the top 
desk drawer of his office at the New York Federal Reserve. It read:  
To the governor of this bank: 
Never forget that it was created to serve the employer and the working man, 
the producer and the consumer, the importer and the exporter, the creditor 
and the debtor; all in the interest of the country as a whole.
6
 
           In 1915 the country was enjoying liquidity and prosperity, thanks, mostly, to 
WWI. During this high time, Strong formed the Open Market Investment Committee 
[OMIC] that was comprised of representatives from district member Federal Reserve 
banks.  
          To ensure a continued strengthening economy, Strong wisely informed them not to 
bid against each other in the New York market for the limited supply of U.S. Treasury 
paper that had become scarce since the start of the war. With the economy healthy, the 
banks would be clamoring for more money to loan out. Strong also wanted the loan 
processes to go through New York to make sure all the banks in the system had access to 
a money market. Strong’s desire for control over the entire system began to take shape 
early.  
          Strong was extremely outspoken about what he considered irresponsibility in 
banking and investing. He had true disdain for shady stock speculators and viewed the 
average American banker as a bottom-feeder and a vulture-like creature, picking at the 
bones of the banks’ reserves during times when he felt discretion and patience better 
suited the economy. He was considered by many to be a snob, and a new-money elitist. 
The farm in Fishkill, New York was far behind him by this point in his life and career. In 
                                                             
6 Chandler, 1. 
 7
a letter to Adolph C. Miller, Strong released some of his venom toward small bankers, 
and urged him to prepare for the worst: 
Until experience has demonstrated the contrary, I fear we must calculate that 
the American banker, by and large, will do in future emergencies just what he 
has done on similar occasions in the past. He will gather up every dollar of 
reserve money that he can lay his hands on and lock it up so tight that the 
Reserve Banks will never get a hold of it until the crisis is past. I personally 
saw that happen in the early 90s, 1907, and 1914. Frankly, our bankers are 




          His views on his fellow reserve banks’ tactics were no less harsh in their criticism. 
In 1922, Strong told a Harvard audience,  
Practically all borrowing by member banks from the Reserve Banks is ex 
post facto. The condition which gives rise to the need for borrowing had 
already come into existence before the application to borrow from the 
Reserve Bank was made. The banks make their loans first, and then hunt for 




          Strong wished to head off stock speculators before they could “damage the 
economy.” However, his theories only truncated the activities of the smaller investor. 
Large firms and individuals of considerable wealth had no use for loans at the stock 
speculation level. Smaller investors were obtaining credit for stock exchange investment, 
and Strong was intent on watching them like a hawk. In this regard he said,  
The best way to control unwise extension of credit at the stock exchange was 
to push the discount rates at the other 11 district Feds a percentage point 
higher than the rate in NY. The differential would suck money out of New 
York to the countryside, forcing the New York banks to call their loans to 
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9 Mayer, 72. 
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          His goal, to keep an eye on these investors was important to him, but he still had to 
balance his disdain for speculators with his main objective of furthering American 
business interests. Strong wrote to the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:  
That orgy [of stock speculation] will always be with us and if the Federal 
Reserve System is to be run solely with the view of regulating stock 
speculation instead of being devoted to the interests of industry and 
commerce of the country, then its policy will degenerate simply to regulating 
the affairs of gamblers.
10
 
           
          Almost immediately after the formation of the Federal Reserve System, and his 
appointment as Governor of the New York branch, Strong was single-minded in his 
efforts to expand the American banking system overseas. He sought to reform the 
currency and bring as many banks as he could into the system to acquire as much gold 
reserve as possible and to develop a major international money market in New York.
11
 
He indicated how important this undertaking was to him in a letter he wrote in January of 
1917, to Charles S. Hamlin, a member of the Federal Reserve Board: 
          If I live and keep my health, you will see our bank in a close and 
important relationship with all the great central banks of Europe where such 
relationships can be of value, and it is one of the matters which had been 
uppermost in my mind ever since we started our organization. When that part 




Years later, in 1927, Strong even joined a representative from J.P. Morgan and visited 
Mussolini to convince him that to keep the Lira strong, he had to make the Bank of Italy 
separate from the Finance Ministry. Mussolini failed to heed their suggestion.
13
 
                                                             
10 Roger W. Spencer and John H. Huston, The Federal Reserve and the Bull Markets: From Benjamin 
Strong to Alan Greenspan (Lewiston, 2006), 7. 
11 A “money market” is the use of a system or institution for the borrowing and lending of liquid 
money in the short term. Examples would be T Bills (or Treasury Bonds), municipal bonds, and 
bankers acceptances. 
12 Chandler, 93. 
13 Mayer, 81. 
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           For this herculean task of networking all the central banks of Europe with the 
Federal Reserve, Strong knew he could not just take on the old guard of ancient European 
financial centers head-on. Instead he promoted cooperation with international monetary 
institutions. Thus, in February of 1916, with the Great War raging, he sailed to Europe to 
negotiate with the leaders of the most powerful banks on the continent. His focus was on 
the Bank of France and the Bank of England. He met with financial leaders from both 
Paris and London and interviewed the men who ran the banks.  
          His work with the French proved to be fruitless, as their noted conservatism mired 
definite agreements. However, the British were much more accepting of Strong’s ideas 
and motives and he achieved much more material results with the Bank of England. In his 
dealings and meetings with bank officials, on March 18
th
 Strong met the man he would 
have an association with for many years to come; Montagu Norman.  
          Strong presented Norman with a letter of introduction and recommendation from 
James Brown, Montagu Norman’s former partner in the New York investment bank and 
trading company, Brown Brothers and Company.
14
 That evening they dined alone in 
Norman’s house and began forging the relationship that influenced the monetary histories 
of both their countries. 
          By March 30
th
 Strong and the representatives of the Bank of England had drafted 
the Memorandum of Conversations between the Governors of the bank of England and 
the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong reported the contents of 
the memorandum to the reserve board upon his return to the States in April. The 
memorandum began: “Confidentially and tentatively agreed upon for submission and 
ratification by the respective institutions, with a view to be put into operation after the 
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conclusion of the war.” It seemed unusual that the war was a non-stop conflagration at 
that point, and the Bank of England and the New York Federal Reserve Bank were 
making deals pending its conclusion. However, no one seemed to make note of this. The 
memorandum contained 11 points: 
1.) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York to act for itself and such of the other 
eleven Reserve Banks as might elect to join the account. 
2.) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York to maintain an account with the Bank of 
England; but because of the law permitting the Federal Reserve Bank to receive 
deposits from only their own members, and the United States Government, any 
accounts with it would have to be in the form of earmarked
15
 gold. 
3.) The Bank of England, to purchase on request prime sterling bills16 for the account 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and these bills to meet “eligibility” 
requirements. 
4.) The accounts, respectively, to be kept free of charges and commissions except for 
out-of-pocket expenses. 
5.) “It is hoped that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will eventually reach an 
arrangement on similar lines with the Bank of France.”
17
 
6.) No announcement, directly or indirectly, to be made regarding the contents of this 
memorandum without the explicit consent of both institutions. 
The other five points dealt with interest rates, earmarking gold, shipment of gold, 
exchange of information, and cancellation provisions.
18
 
                                                             
15 “Earmarking” is setting aside funds (or in this case, gold) to pay for something specific. 
16 “Sterling bills” is in reference to the “pound sterling” which is England’s home currency. 
17 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, led by Benjamin Strong, did reach arrangements with the 
Bank of France. 
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          On April 26, 1916 the directors of the New York branch approved Strong’s 
proposal. His plea for approval from the Federal Reserve Board was cut short because in 
early June, Strong was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the lungs, and his doctor ordered 
him to the thin air of Colorado for a year of rest and recuperation. Robert H. Treman was 
appointed deputy governor in his absence, but Strong continued his pressure on the Board 
for approval from the healthier air of the Rocky Mountains of Colorado
19
 
          On August 29
th
 the Board tentatively approved the agreement with the provision 
that no business would commence until after the war. But the Board set off a bitter 
controversy between itself and the directors of the New York branch by immediately 
violating the sixth provision of the agreement.  
          Officials of the New York branch, including Strong, found out about the final 
approval in the newspapers. The Board sent the notification to chairman, Pierre Jay, in an 
envelope marked, “Confidential,” disregarding the New York board, and Jay was on 
vacation. The press got wind of the approval, printed it, and the board of the New York 
branch was left out of the loop, completely. The Federal Reserve Board revealed its 
autonomy and fullness of power with this act.  
          However, all was forgiven when the Bank of England agreed to ratify the 
agreement and the Bank of France followed in February of 1917, with the war still 
raging. This relationship with both European banks was unprecedented, and Strong’s 
vision for “our bank” to become an international powerhouse with the cooperation of the 
central banks of Europe, began.
20
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          Montagu Norman worked with Benjamin Strong on almost every deal the New 
York Federal Reserve made with the Bank of England. The two men became such good 
friends that they would vacation together at Bar Harbor, Maine and the South of France. 
Steady flows of letters over years of collaboration kept their banking and personal 
relationships taut and up to date.  
          Norman came from a family of bankers. Both his mother and father came from 
prominent British banking families. He prepped at Eton, failed out of King’s College 
after a year, and went to work at his father’s banking firm, Martin’s Bank, in 1882. He 
journeyed to America and worked at his grandfather’s firm, Brown, Shipley and 
Company in New York. For reasons unknown he traveled across the United States and 
back, said to be learning about the American financial system, and then he returned to 
Brown, Shipley and Company in 1898. Two years later he was made a partner.  
          Never married and quite foppish, Norman did not look the part of a banking mogul, 
and before his experience in the Boer War he never did care for competition and was a 
lonely and isolated individual. In the war he was placed in charge of a unit whose duty 
was to hunt down Boer commandos. It was during this time where he found a sense of 
adventure, enthusiasm, confidence, and the killer instinct he never knew existed in him. 
He found who he was in war. He wrote to his parents, “I feel a different person now… 
One looks ahead with something of dismay to the time when one will again have to settle 
down to civilized life.”
21
 So, instead of civilized life, he returned to the banking industry. 
          A few years later he returned to England and was elected as the director of the 
Bank of England in 1907. By 1918 he was the deputy governor, and in 1920 he became 
governor. The traditional practice at the time was that the governorship of the Bank of 
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          The United States and Brown, Shipley and Company have a long and storied 
history together. J.P. Morgan Company began as George Peabody and Company, which 
began in 1814 as Peabody and Riggs, in Georgetown, District of Columbia, dealing in 
dry goods and operators of the Georgetown Slave Market. In 1815 they moved to 
Baltimore to be closer to the supply of both dry goods and slaves. From there, Peabody’s 
business through importing and exporting began to flourish in London. So he then 
established the firm of George Peabody and Company in London. He was able to make 
this seamless entry into the London business scene with the help of his British friend in 
Baltimore, Alexander Brown. Alexander Brown possessed his already established firm in 
Liverpool called Brown Brothers, and operated Alex Brown and Son out of Baltimore. 
Back in 1801 he founded Brown, Shipley and Company, which remains to this day as the 
oldest banking house in the United States; presently operating as Brown Brothers 
Harriman, of which Prescott Bush (Father of former president George H.W. Bush, and 
grandfather of the more recent former president George W. Bush) was a partner.
23
 
          During WWI, Benjamin Strong’s good friend, and fellow Morgan man, Henry P. 
Davidson also traveled to England when Strong was there, meeting with Montague 
Norman to hammer out the Memorandum of Conversations between the Governors of the 
bank of England and the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Davidson 
represented the great interests of the J.P. Morgan Company in the overseas war effort.  
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23 Eustace Mullins, Secrets of the Federal Reserve: The London Connection (Staunton, 1984), 48-49. 
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J. P. Morgan adroitly used these long-standing ties with the British investment banks, his 
emissary, Davidson, and his former “lieutenant,” Strong, to get the “House of Morgan 
named as the sole purchasing agent in the United States, for the duration of the war, for 
war material for both Britain and France.”
24
 
          After WWI, the League of Nations required a certain aloofness from U.S. banking 
and business interests. But Strong had made his intentions very clear about financing 
reconstruction programs for allied countries after the war. After the armistice of 
November 11, 1918, Strong wrote to Montagu Norman, “There is no doubt that much of 
the world’s happiness in the future will depend upon the relations now being established 
between your country and ours.” The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve began 
drawing the plans for the design of the world’s new economic landscape.
25
 
          Since Norman was not only unbound by the restrictions of the League of Nations, 
many of Norman’s associates were on the League’s Financial Committee for relief, 
reconstruction, and stabilization. The League was one of his principal channels for 
floating loans to beleaguered countries through any central bank he wished. Since Strong 
and the New York Federal Reserve represented the world’s greatest economic power, and 
the largest monetary gold stock in the world, it was the largest potential source of 
international loans, and the two men collaborated despite both U.S. and global political 
restrictions.  
          To Strong and Norman, the United States and British post-war governments were 
dominating them with monetary policy intervention, and they did not believe either 
government had their best interests in mind. So the two men worked together through 
                                                             
24 Murray N. Rothbard. The Case Against the Fed (Auburn, 2012), 70. 
25 Ahamed, 132. 
 15
central banking, in the face of government reprisal, and succeeded by using loopholes in 
the charter of the League of Nations.
26
 
          This was one of the catalysts that sparked the friendship and association of Strong 
and Norman, which in turn formed a banking coalition between the United States and 
England that would influence the entire economies of both countries, and even the 
world’s. The whole time, the two men conducted their business while continuing to 
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